Week 3: (Re)Positioning the Shadows

This week's readings highlight a number of issues for me. I'll start this reflection that mixes my perspective as critic and my perspective as citizen by talking in more broad strokes and then moving to a few specific issues that arose for me in the readings.

The ideological underpinnings of our research have a major influence on what we choose to study, how we choose to study it and what we deem to be appropriate measures for specific outcomes that we wish to explore. For example, in the Parks (1995) article, he draws attention to Burgoon's observation that patient satisfaction is not strongly related to either health status or patient compliance, though patient satisfaction is one of the primary measures of good communication in healthcare interactions. While I've not (yet) read Burgoon's piece dealing with this, I have noted and been troubled by patient satisfaction as one of the dominant measures of health interactions, particularly in my exploration of the compliance literature. So many things will determine patient satisfaction with their medical encounters, not the least of which is the news that is being delivered regarding diagnoses, treatment options, discussion about habits that must be changed. We all know, as educators, that sometimes our students are dissatisfied with us when we point out their shortcomings in their work. However, our failure to do so short circuits the learning process. This measure for the quality of health communication in research is, at best, incomplete, and at worst, a dangerous oversight that threatens a complete misfire on the part of the efforts of research in this area. The ideology of openness and, importantly, ideologies that privilege individual satisfaction and social harmony (Parks, 1995) threaten the validity and application of research in health communication. Clearly, an awareness of and attention to the ideologies that drive our research projects at every stage of their development is crucial to our ability to engage in research that is salient both in the academy and in the lay public. In short, it's crucial to our attempts to conduct truly translational research.

This leads me to consider Parks' over-arching comment about an Intellectual Commons--a space where various paradigmatic approaches to research can come together on equal footing, with a common understanding of the inherent values and limitations to each approach and the resultant research. The hope, as I read the article, would be that researchers from all paradigms can inform one another's work to understand a social issue and the communication processes inherent within it more holistically as opposed to spending energy justifying a single approach by cutting down/de-legitimizing a different viewpoint. I think most of us see this as graduate students. My concern is that the institution of academia is structured in a way that inhibits us to act on this common sense approach to academics. If we want to be successful as defined within the academy, we have to demonstrate not just the inherent value, but the superiority of our questions, research approach, methodology and ultimately, our paradigm as we compete for journal space, research dollars, and tenure. I realize this is not a new revelation, it's something we've all struggled with for a long time, and articles like Parks' highlight the issue and open a space to discuss it-- a positive thing. But what, if anything, has been done to re-structure the academy to support this collaborative spirit across paradigms?

The entire discussion about deception, avoidance, secrets and advice was interesting...each of them independently and taken together. As I was reading all of this, I kept thinking about positioning. Where are we positioning ourselves as researchers as we study these things? Who are we defining as the "victim" in this and who is the "perpetrator"? Should we set our research up in this way? Is anything ever that black and white--we know as researchers that we are simultaneously deceivers and deceived; secret keepers and the person kept in the dark; advice givers and receivers. To study an individual in just one of these roles feels incomplete, particularly as acts of deception or secret keeping or advice giving (although in different ways) are likely to impact the perception we have as the "victims" of secrets, lies or as receivers of (un)wanted advice. What other ways might we approach our research? Is the very polarization of our research part of what comprises the dark side of each construct? This, I realize, goes back to the ideologies at work framing/shaping our approach to these questions. So, first, the researcher's perspective seems important here, as does how we position the act (light or dark) and who, from this decision, is positioned as the "victim" and who as the "perpetrator". So positioning, all around, is the first consideration that pops into my mind as I read these articles.

Now that I've considered the readings in broad strokes, I'm going to narrow things down a bit and consider the readings on deception. I've always been a little resistant to the study of deception because it has always felt paternalistic somehow. This week's chapter by O'Hair and Cody did nothing to challenge this preconceived notion I took into my reading. Perhaps my bias tainted my read of the chapter, and if so, I am looking forward to hearing how others read it.  Take the taxonomy of motives for deception presented in O'Hair & Cody chapter on p.195. It's far too simplistic, in my view, to have a universal rule that all deception is bad, and this taxonomy is a nice attempt at breaking down various motives for deception. The motives of the deceiver portrayed as either self or other centered and the intent as either positive or negative is useful to consider the reasoning for the deception. Separating the act from the motive (or, in terms from last week's class discussion aka Allison, the intent) is an important step for one part of the analysis, and in taking that step, this complex issue begins to look a bit more clear--for a while. But I'm not sure I am comfortable with the idea that the ethical implications of the act are primarily decided based on the intent of the deceiver (one party in the inherently multi-party act) and the outcome for the deceived. Perhaps the taxonomy attempts to address this, and I'm missing it. I'm not sure...but if it is addressing it, I feel that it is fundamentally flawed...and that leads my to my second criticism of the research on deception presented in this chapter.

I feel like the taxonomy presented and the approach to deception itself (based on what was presented in the O'Hair & Cody chapter) is fundamentally flawed in that it seems reliant on what the participants in these studies perceive to be lies. Perhaps I missed it in this write up, and perhaps those of you more familiar with IPC research have differing thoughts on this, but it seems to me that the research that was discussed in this article on deception was reliant on the participants' identifying the act as a lie. So, for example, the claim from the Shippee (1977) article that people lie most often to hurt other people rather than to help them seems perhaps skewed in that it could be that benevolent lies are not perceived as lies by those engaging in them. Those lies, the ones perceived as benevolent may not be remembered as keenly (no guilt associated with them as compared to malevolent lies). Perhaps they aren't even thought of as lies as individuals consider them in the context of their relationships. Our distinction between malevolent and benevolent deception makes sense for us studying the construct retrospectively--it makes GREAT sense in fact. However, those that we are studying may not even perceive these two types of deception as deception. Perhaps this was controlled for better than I think in this study, and perhaps this has been addressed in subsequent research on deception--I realize that this criticism could be way off the mark here, as I am basing this observation on one chapter dealing with deception, but, I do think it's an interesting point to consider. Distinguishing between academic understandings of the constructs we study and ensuring that the lay public (and those we study) recognize them in the same way we study them is essential.

The taxonomy here is presented from the viewpoint of the deceiver (at least if I am understanding it) and the deceiver's motives to hurt or help the deceived. Where is the deceived in this taxonomy?  They mention Bok's, Deetz' and others' observation that deceptive communication is an "obstruction to meaningful communication systems" (O'Hair & Cody, p. 201). I agree--how can one communicator contribute to the negotiation of a shared meaning under false pretenses...without all the information? But then, I disagree--deception, secrets, disclosure....all of this is a part of the negotiation of a shared meaning between two communicators. So, perhaps deception as a process is just another part of meaning making unique to that relational, social and cultural context. They go onto say that in the face of deception, mutual understanding and shared meaning become subordinate goals. Perhaps they do...but in Deetz' other work he talks of communication as the destruction of what each communicator brings to the encounter--the destruction of the pre-conceived realities that each communicator brings to the table to make room for the creation of something totally new-- NEW meaning created by those communicators in the interaction.  Is there room for deception in this new meaning? Perhaps there is. The creation of a shared meaning depends on the negotiation of meaning, and if deception is negotiated in the relationship, then perhaps it can still contribute to the creation of a new shared meaning--perhaps eventually it will be re-negotiated in light of the "truth", but the here and now, deception is a part of that new meaning.

It seems that perhaps the study of deception might benefit from the approach that Goldsmith & Fitch (1997) take with advice-- as a symbolic (open to and dependent on interpretation...thereby implicating all parties in the act) and rhetorical (multiple goals and outcomes and that effective interactants are those who deploy discursive resources in ways that are adapted to meet those demands)--see p.455.This strategy seems to account for the interactive nature of advice, and I think it would enhance the approach to the study of deception, creating more space for the deceived instead of being so focused on the deceiver's motives as justification for the deceptive act.

Finally, I want to say a word about the advice article by Goldsmith & Fitch (1997). This article resonated with me on a personal level. The article positions advice giving as a symbolic and rhetorical act and claims that it operates on both emotional and informational levels. This perspective allows for the giver and receiver to be simultaneously considered in the interaction and contextualizes the act in relational and cultural contexts. I really appreciated this approach as a researcher. I was drawn to the discussion about how advice givers made decisions regarding whether or not to offer advice to someone in order to protect/support the identity of the potential receiver of the advice and/or protect the relationship. In particular, I see this happen in my own sibling relationships. My younger sister and I have had an interesting relationship over the years. Suffice it to say that we were once very close, my role was as her protector and she, I think, felt as if she was living in my shadow for many years (sort of wind beneath your wings kind of a thing, I guess). Over time, she developed her confidence and stepped out from the shadows, for which I was extremely happy. She, however, saw our relationship as something that needed to change so she could maintain this autonomy. She began to distance herself from me so she could stand clearly on her own. As adults, this has been tense, and, while much better now, there were many contentious years in there.  At any rate, she has begun opening up to me more now.

My sister has significant health problems. She doctor-shops, changing physicians as she hears things she doesn't want to hear, and settles on doctors that she can agree with or at least who are comfortable with her failure to comply with advice, sometimes opting to work with physicians that are not specialists in areas that she is being treated (ie, taking an allergists opinion over a neurologists opinion regarding brain swelling).  As her older sister, and someone who cares deeply for her, I feel an obligation to risk our relationship (and it would be a major risk) to advise her to take her specialist's advice. I know that doing so will likely result in her pulling away from me, distancing and perhaps forever ruin/damage the relationship. My decision to intervene is driven by multiple goals--I have a desire to maintain the relationship (particularly since it was only recently restored), I have a desire to see my sister be healthy and happy, I have a desire to support my sister's identity as an autonomous, independent, competent woman, and there are several more goals I have in  mind when I consider this potential interaction. My fear is that she will perceive me as using this as an opportunity to demonstrate that I am smarter than her, wiser, more credible, in essence--more powerful in the sibling relationship--something she has worked long and hard to debunk.

In the end, my concerns for her medical well being won out. So, I engaged in deception as I offered advice. This deception came in the form of minimizing my concern for her condition while still stating the concern (done so she would accept the advice more readily rather than immediately tuning me out). I engaged in shades of honesty (deception) as I balanced the tension between honesty and support mentioned by O'Hair & Cody. As I affirmed the conclusions she had arrived at after telling me about her tests, etc, I simultaneously challenged the interpretation of the tests, framing it as a mistake the physician made rather than pointing the proverbial finger at her (even as I am well aware that the physician has interpreted and communicated the test results correctly).

 In my view, my deception was simultaneously self (protecting my image of myself as an expert), other (done to help improve her health) and relationally (intended to protect the viability of our relationship) centered. It could not be separated to fit in the taxonomy presented in O'Hair & Cody's chapter. Deception, then, cannot be seen simply as operating in just one of these areas, further highlighting my problem with the taxonomy. My decision to give or withhold advice in my relationship has ethical implications as well--something that was not discussed in the Goldsmith & Fitch article. In a relationship, which priority is most ethically acceptable? When does one priority win out over the other? In what relational context?

If you consider this from a perspective of functional ambivalence---Is my decision to offer my advice functional? Yes from a health standpoint (if I'm right), no from a relational standpoint (particularly if I'm wrong). Is it morally acceptable? It depends on your perspective, your priorities, the intent and the outcome. The outcome is what society will likely use to determine the morality of the communicative act. The intent may or may not be considered (or even known) at a social or even relational level. So, does morality operate differently in the private sphere than the public sphere--and how does this play into our definition of functional ambivalence? If the dark side of communication operates at the intersection of functionality and normativity, how do we (or do we) account for morality at the public and private levels in our definition?